at Bayeux, eternally weaving into her web dim figures of the ever-lengthening past,-figures too dim to be noticed by the idle, too symbolic to be interpreted except by her pupils, but to the discerning eye disclosing every painful step and every world-shaking contest by which mankind has worked and fought its way from savage isolation to organic social life. 1 This all started with a deceptively simple-sounding pair of questions: "What is legal pragmatism, and is there anything worthwhile in it?" It will end, however, with some not-so-simple answers: "What is called 'legal pragmatism' today is very different from the older style of legal pragmatism traditionally associated with Oliver Wendell Holmes; and there is much that is worthwhile in the conception of law revealed by reading Holmes's 'The Path of the Law' in the light of the philosophy of the classical pragmatist tradition, though less in contemporary legal neo-pragmatism." As I articulate and defend these answers, my reflections on the varieties of pragmatism -philosophical and legal, old and new-will be wrapped around my exploration of the meaning of "The Path of the Law" and the strengths and weaknesses of its arguments.
I. LEGAL PRAGMATISM TODAY
Of late, the word "pragmatism" appears in the titles of books, chapters, and articles on legal philosophy often enough to convey the impression that there must be some kind of renaissance of pragmatism going on among legal scholars. 2 When you look at the contents of those books and articles, though, you are likely to find yourself more than a little confused about just what this apparent renaissance is a renaissance of.
Pragmatism, you will read, is simply a "general aversion to theory" (Atiyah, 1987); 3 it is "solving legal problems using every tool that comes to hand, including precedent, tradition, legal text, and social policy- [and] renounc [ing] the entire project of providing a theoretical foundation for constitutional law" (Farber, 1988) ; 4 an "understand [ing] that what we see always depends upon our viewpoint, and that understanding others is frequently a matter of attempting to recreate the standpoint from which they view events" (Hantzis, 1988) ; 5 "a realistic expression of the recognition that metatheoretical claims to truth are philosophically indefensible" (Patterson, 1990 );6 "freedom from theory-guilt" (Grey, 1990); 7 "a kind of exhortation about theorizing ... not say [ing] things that lawyers and judges do not know, but rather remind [ing] lawyers and judges of what they already believe but often fail to practice" (Smith, 1990 );8 "looking at problems concretely, without illusions, with a full awareness of the limitations of human reason, with a sense of the "localness" of human knowledge, the difficulty of translations between cultures, the unattainability of 'truth"' (Posner, 19 9 0 ); 9 the view that "practice is not undergirded by an overarching [sic] set of immutable principles, or by an infallible or impersonal method" (Fish, 1990 ); 1 o "a synthesis of contextualism and instrumentalism" (Grey, 1991);" "antifoundationalism, and ... social optimism" (Hoy, 1991);12 "the distinctly American philosophical movement begun by C. S. Peirce and William James, developed by John Dewey, and recently espoused by Richard Rorty ... a substantive position ... [which] yields relativism about truth and justice" (Warner, 1993) ; 13 "an eclectic, result-oriented, historically-minded antiformalis[m]" (Luban, 1996); 14 "a critique of essentialist/conceptualist formalism, and an admonition to avoid excessive theorizing or abstractions," urging "more dialogue, traditionalism, attention to context, and the middle way" (Tamanaha, 1997); 1 the idea that "a satisfactory theory of adjudication for lawyers must enable lawyers to predict what courts will do" (Leiter, 1997-8);
1 6 "a philosophical discourse that is general, hysteric, external, practical, and progressive, and beside it a legal antecedent discourse (that of Holmes) that is professional, obsessive, internal, theoretical, and conservative" (Alberstein, 2002); 17 "a disposition to base action on facts and consequences rather than on conceptualisms, generalities, pieties, and slogans ... reject[ing] moral, legal and political theory when offered to guide legal ... decisionmaking" (Posner, 2003) ; 18 "an extension of skepticism, ultimately rooted in Greek sophism" (Leaf, 2003) ; 19 an acknowledgment that "devotion to theory may be just as damaging and unfruitful as devotion to traditional legal formalism" (Weaver, 2003) ;21 "an eclectic and self-reflective stance about both theory and methods; a recognition of a plurality of contingent 'truths' and 'meanings' that are grounded in concrete experience rather than absolute or fundamental truths; and avoidance of dichotomies and uni-dimensional approaches and an explicit incorporation of democratic ideals in both the outcomes (goals) of public policy and in the way that policy analysis is itself conducted" (Schneider and Ingram, 2003) ;21 the view that "the validity of consensus building depends not on its theoretical 16. Brian Leiter, "Naturalism and Pragmatism in Legal Theory," section III of "Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence," Virginia Law Review 76 (1997-98) possibility of achieving 'win-win' solutions, but on the efficacy of consensus building in its application" (Coglianese, 2003) . 22 What we have here is not simply-as perhaps we do with "realism" and "positivism" 2-a divergence of the legal meaning(s) of a word from its philosophical meaning(s); it is a desperately confusing scholarly mare's nest. Rather than tackling it directly, I shall first sketch the origins of the classical pragmatist tradition in philosophy, and Oliver Wendell Holmes's place in this story; and then articulate the complex argument of "The Path of the Law," and explore what this famous lecture of Holmes's might have to teach us now. With this work in hand, it should be possible to dispel at least some of the current confusions.
II. THE PRAGMATIST TRADITION IN PHILOSOPHY
Besides its use(s) in legal theory, the word "pragmatism" has, of course, both an everyday and a technical philosophical use-well, I say "of course"; but (of course!) the two are often run together, and the philosophical use is ambiguous to say the least.
In the eighteenth century, to describe someone as a pragmatist was to say that he was a practical, busy person. By the late nineteenth century, and apparently for much of the twentieth, the word had acquired a pejorative tone, as "pragmatic" came to mean "officious, opinionated," and "pragmatism," correspondingly, "officious meddlesomeness." By now, the meaning of these words has shifted once again: in ordinary speech today, "pragmatism" usually connotes concern with expediency rather than principle, with "matters of fact, often to the exclusion of intellectual or artistic matters; practical as opposed to idealistic. 2 4 22. Gary Coglianese, "Does Consensus Work? A Pragmatic Approach to Public Participation in the Regulatory Process," in Morales, Renascent Pragmatism [supra, n. 19], 180-95, 189.
23. "Realism" has not one but umpteen philosophical meanings (see Susan Haack, "Realisms and Their Rivals: Recovering Our Innocence," Facta Philosophica 4 (2002) 67-88); but they share the idea that something-truth, reality, moral or epistemic or etc., values, or whatever-is, in some sense, independent of us. And "positivism," as used philosophically, is understood sometimes in more and sometimes in less expansive ways.
24 In philosophy, "classical pragmatism" refers to the late nineteenth-century movement in American philosophy of which the first moment was Charles Sanders Peirce's pragmatic maxim, which characterized meaning in terms of the "pragmatic" (practical, experiential) consequences of a concept's applying; and by extension to later work in the spirit of this tradition. "Neopragmatism" refers to the late twentieth-century development associated with Richard Rorty's attacks on foundationalism, essentialism, and scientism.
It was William James who, in 1898, first put the word "pragmatism" into philosophical currency, and who made this style of philosophy famous. 2 " But James acknowledged that the key idea had arisen in discussions with Peirce at the Metaphysical Club in Cambridge, Mass., in the very early 1870s. Indeed, some seeds of pragmatism are already discernable in Peirce's 1868 series of anti-Cartesian papers and his 1871 review of Fraser's edition of the works of George Berkeley; 2 6 and Peirce had articulated the pragmatist conception of meaning, quite unmistakably, in a paper published in 1878: "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," 27 which he would later describe as "a little paper expressing some of the opinions I had been urging [at the Metaphysical Club] under the name of pragmatism." However, he explained, when he published this paper he had deliberately avoided the word "pragmatism," because "in those medieval times, I dared not in type use an English word to express an idea unrelated to its received meaning" 28 -i.e., presumably, its then received meaning, "officious meddlesomeness. 29 founder of pragmatism in a lecture at Harvard in 1903; though the dove he had sent forth in 1878 had never returned to him, he wrote, "of late quite a brood of young ones have been fluttering about, from the feathers of which I might fancy that mine had found a brood., 30 Both Peirce and James wrote that they saw pragmatism as a method, an approach to philosophical questions focused on pragmatic consequences, not as a body of philosophical doctrine; and pragmatist philosophy was from the beginning extraordinarily various. It encompassed a vast range of interests, areas, and angles-as the young Italian philosopher Giovanni Papini emphasized when he likened pragmatism to a great hotel, where all the guests pass through the same corridor, but each works alone in his own room on the questions that especially interest him. But a second and less benign kind of variousness was also present from the beginning, in differences between Peirce' s understanding of the Pragmatic Maxim and James' construal: Peirce stressed the connection between "pragmatic" and Kant's "pragmatische," meaning, roughly, "experiential," as contrasted with "apriori"; James stressed the connection between "pragmatic" and the Greek "praxis," "action," as contrasted with theory.
These differences became more marked as Peirce moved towards a realist, subjunctive formulation of the maxim (according to which to say, for example, that a diamond is hard, means not just that if it is rubbed against other substances it will scratch them, but that if it were rubbed against them it would scratch them); 31 and as James developed his doctrine of the Will to Believe, and then found himself struggling, not entirely successfully, to distinguish this doctrine from the pragmatism-as-method he took himself to share with Peirce. By 1905-though writing warmly of James and even of the radical British pragmatist F. C. S. Schiller-Peirce was complaining about the "merciless abuse" to which his word had been subjected in the literary journals, abuse so egregious that he was ready "to kiss his child good-by," and "to announce the birth of the word 'pragmaticism,' which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers. 3 2 In view of the potential for fissure already present in the differences between Peirce' s and James's elaborations of the pragmatic method, and the potential for confusion with this or that specific philosophical doctrine, not to mention the shifting meaning of the word in ordinary usage, the subsequent fragmentation of philosophical pragmatisms is hardly surprising. And once Rorty got hold of James, pragmatism took a sharply radical turn: what could be further from Peirce's observations that the truth "is SO, whether you, or I, or anybody believes it is so or not," and that "every man is fully convinced that there is such a thing as truth, or he would not ask any question" 33 than Rorty's cheerful boast that he "does not have much use for the notion of 'objective truth'," or his breezy assurance that truth is "entirely a matter of solidarity"? 34 Wide-ranging as their philosophical interests were-Peirce's in logic, semiotic, metaphysics, cosmology, theory of inquiry, philosophy of science, and so on, James's in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, ethics, and so forth-neither had much to say about the philosophy of law. Though recently it seems to have been Rorty' s style of neo-pragmatism that has been most warmly welcomed by legal commentators, traditionally it is Oliver Wendell Holmes who has been seen as the originator of the pragmatist tradition in legal theory. Elsewhere, I have traced the evolution of philosophical pragmatism from Peirce to Rorty and beyond; 35 here, I shall begin with Holmes's place in the classical-pragmatist chapter of this story.
Holmes, we know, attended some of Peirce' s lectures at the Lowell Institute in 1866;36 and he seems to have been involved in the Metaphysical Club even before the beginning. In 1868 James had written to him from Berlin, proposing "[w]hen I get home let's establish a philosophical society to have regular meetings and discuss none but the very tallest and broadest questions-to be composed of none but the very topmost of Boston manhood," and predicting that this might "grow into something very important after a sufficient number of years." 37 In 1906, reminiscing in print about the origins of pragmatism, Peirce testifies to the influence of two other attorneys who also participated: Nicholas St. John Green, "a skillful lawyer, ... a disciple of Jeremy Bentham," who urged the importance of applying Alexander Bain's definition of belief as "that upon which a man is prepared to act"-from which, Peirce continues, "pragmatism is scarce more than a corollary"; and Chauncey Wright, "something of a philosophical celebrity in those days ... our boxing-master whom we ... used to face to be severely pummeled." While he also writes warmly of Holmes-"Mr Justice Holmes will not, I believe, take it ill that we are proud to remember his membership" 3 9 -Peirce says nothing specific about his influence. Holmes himself would later write that he thought he "learned more from Chauncey Wright and St. John Green" than from Peirce; and express reservations about Hartshorne's prediction that the publication of Peirce's papers would be an important philosophical event. ' And-not surprisingly, given that the then-common meaning of "pragmatism" was so off-putting, and that The Common Law and "The Path of the Law" were both published before James had put the word into circulation in its special philosophical sense-Holmes never officially allied himself with pragmatism. Indeed, when James introduced his pragmatism to the philosophical world Holmes, like many readers, had trouble distinguishing it from the Will to Believe-which he described in a letter to Frederick Pollock as "an amusing humbug." ' 4 In 1942, Max Fisch described Holmes's The Common Law as "full of the spirit of pragmatism from the ringing sentences in which its theme is announced-'the life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience'--on to the end"; 46 ... a legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court;-and so of a legal right.
[Holmes]' 9 a paper which in fact articulates the cosmological theory Peirce calls "agapism," positing the evolution of order from chaos by "affinity."
43. "The Holmes-Cohen Correspondence," ed. Indeed, Fisch once suggested that, rather than Holmes's idea being a special case of Peirce's, Peirce's pragmatic maxim may have been a kind of extrapolation of this strand in Holmes's thinking 5 " (as, it seems, J. L. Austin's theory of performative utterances was a kind of extrapolation of H. L. A. Hart's concept of operative speech). 5 For Holmes had expressed something like this idea as early as 1872, in a note in the American Law Review in which, summarizing and endorsing Pollock's critique of John Austin's Lectures on Jurisprudence, he had written:
[A]s is clear from numerous instances of judicial interpretation of statutes and of constitutions in this country, ... in a civilized state it is not the will of the sovereign that makes lawyers' law, even when that is its source, but what a body of subjects, namely the judges, by whom it is enforced, say is his will. ... The only question for lawyers is, how will the judges act? 52
Fisch's conjecture oversimplifies, however. As I noted earlier, some protopragmatist ideas were already apparent in Peirce's work before this note of Holmes's; moreover, the philosophy of law Holmes had developed by the time of "The Path of the Law" turns out to be far subtler and more sophisticated than the label "prediction theory" suggests. So we need to look more closely.
III. THE PATH OF THE LAW: OR, You TAKE THE Low ROAD AND I'LL TAKE THE HIGH ROAD
Holmes's elegantly aphoristic style has tempted many readers to assume that this or that memorable phrase in "The Path of the Law" encapsulates the whole; but summary descriptions like "the prediction theory," "the Bad Man theory," or "the revolt against formalism," and one-dimensional pictures of Holmes simply as early precursor of the legal-realist movement or of the lawand-economics approach, as anti-theoretical, etc., aren't really adequate to the depth, or the inner complexities, of his jurisprudence.
Inner complexities-or inner contradictions? The opening lines of "The Path of the Law" seem eminently down-to-earth and practical: "When we study law we are not studying a mystery but a well-known profession. We are studying what we shall want in order to appear before judges, or to advise people in such a way as to keep them out of court.... The object of our study 50 ... is ... the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts" ("The Path of the Law," p.391). But Holmes's closing lines take us very far from mundane practical concerns about when the bailiff may be expected at the door: "happiness, I am sure from having known many successful men, cannot be won simply by being counsel for great corporations and having an income of fifty thousand dollars. An intellect great enough to win the prize needs other food besides success. The remoter and more general aspects of the law are those which give it universal interest. It is through them that you ... connect your subject with the universe, and catch an echo of the whole, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law" (405-6). Some may be inclined simply to ignore these concluding sentences, or to write them off as nothing more than an embarrassing effusion of late-nineteenth-century purple prose; but this would be a mistake. There is a larger picture here, a larger picture in which Holmes's briskly practical opening and his visionary closing are seamlessly integrated.
As he climbs the steep path from the mundane specificities that concern the working attorney to the intellectual aspirations of the legal theorist, Holmes's arguments begin negatively. His concern is to dispel some common illusions: Law, he argues, cannot be identified with Morality; does not transcend the specific practices of the many and various legal systems; and bears little resemblance to a set of first principles or axioms from which correct decisions may be deduced.
Unjust laws have been enforced; and though terms like "duty," "right," "malice," "intent," etc., play a role both in moral and in legal discourse, their meanings diverge in the two contexts (nor are all legitimate moral demands legally enforced, or legally enforceable). So, to begin to get a clear view of the law as'distinct from morality, we need to set ethical considerations firmly aside: Holmes advises taking the perspective of a working attorney advising a hypothetical client who doesn't give a damn what's right, but just wants to know what's legal. Thus: "If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, and not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or out of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience" (392).
When "our friend the bad man" (393) consults an attorney, he isn't interested in The Law in the abstract: he wants to know what the current law in Massachusetts (or wherever) is. Moreover, since statutes, rules, and precedents are to some degree open-textured and, where they are, may be construed in more than one way, the bad man wants to know, not just what the statutes, etc., say, but how judges can be expected to interpret them. Thus: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law" (393). It is this strand of the argument, of course, that is captured in the description of Holmes's approach as "the prediction theory," and-along with the focus on the Bad Man-in the classification of Holmes'as proto-legal-realist.
Judges tend to present their rulings and opinions as if they were deductions from general principles-in "logical form," as Holmes says; and often suppose that judicial dissent must be a sign that someone has made a mistake in logic. This, however, is another illusion. To be sure, logic has a place in law; still, a legal system is very different from a set of axioms from which correct decisions may be deduced. 3 Judicial dissent is unavoidable; for disagreements among judges really turn, not on the formal validity or invalidity of their arguments, but on their substantively different ideas about questions of policy. Thus: "The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic ... [But b]ehind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment" (397). It is this strand of the argument, of course, that is captured by classifying Holmes's approach under the rubric "the revolt against formalism., 54 Now Holmes can move to higher jurisprudential ground, and present a positive account of the growth and evolution of the law going far beyond thelaw-in-England-in-1215 or the-law-in-Massachusetts-in-1896."5 The first side of this positive account is historical: the intelligent study of its history illuminates the forces that made present law thus and so. This will sometimes reveal, however, that the source of a legal distinction or rule, etc., is to be found in circumstances or procedures which no longer obtain, or that there is no better warrant for a rule we still confidently enforce than that things have always been done this way.
Holmes gives as example the doctrine in English law that "a material alteration of a written contract by a party avoids it as against him" (402); i.e., not only can you not use the writing, but the contract itself is cancelled-a 55. I chose 1215 because this was the date of Magna Carta, and of the fourth Lateran Council, which prohibited priests from participating in in-court tests by ordeal; and 1896 because this was the date of "The Path of the Law."
Vol. 50 doctrine, Holmes argues, explicable only historically. Once upon a time, in the case of a bond specifically, the contract was inseparable from the actual parchment on which it was written; if the document was destroyed or the seal torn off, the obligee could not recover because the bond no longer existed. 5 6 Then, contrary to the general tendency of the law, this doctrine was extended to contracts generally.
However, Holmes insists, "this is how we have always done it" is no reason for continuing to do things that way: "[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds on which it was laid down have vanished long since ..." (399). 7 And so the other part of Holmes's positive account is forward-looking: the intelligent study of "the ends which [legal] rules seek to accomplish, the reasons why those ends are desired, what is given up to gain them, and whether those ends are worth the price" (404) can illuminate how the law might best adapt itself to new circumstances.
In considering how well this or that interpretation of a law meets the ends which justified having the law in the first place, Holmes urges that judges look to the social and economic consequences of their rulings: "I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage. ... I cannot but believe that if the training of lawyers led them habitually to consider more definitely and explicitly the social advantage on which the law they lay down must be justified, they sometimes would hesitate where now they are confident, and see that really they were taking sides upon debatable ... questions" (398). Hence Holmes's dictum that "[flor the rational study of the law the blackletter man may be the man of the present; but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics" (399)-which, of course, is the strand of his argument that is captured by enlisting him as precursor of the "law and economics" movement.
However, it isn't only economics Holmes has in mind, but the social sciences generally. He also illustrates the role of considerations of "social advantage" when he asks: "[w]hat better have we than a blind guess to show 56. As, today, there is no obligation to pay if the actual physical check is destroyed (an analogy I owe to Jonnette Watson-Hamilton).
57. Compare this, from Javins v. First National Reality Corporation, 428 F.2d 1071, 1 (1970): 'The assumption of landlord-tenant law, derived from feudal property law, that a lease primarily conveyed to the tenant an interest in land may have been reasonable in a rural agrarian society.... But in the case of the modern apartment dweller, the value of the lease is that it gives him a place to live. ... Some courts have realized that certain of the old rules of property law governing leases are inappropriate for today's transactions." My thanks to Terence Anderson for drawing this case to my attention.
that the criminal law in its present form does more good than harm?", and urges that judges look to the work of social scientists who are beginning to investigate whether the criminal "is a degenerate, bound to swindle or murder by as deep seated an organic necessity as that which makes the rattlesnake bite," or whether "crime, like normal human conduct, is mainly a matter of imitation" (400).58
Now the path from the rocky foothills of Holmes's opening words to the Olympian heights of his final peroration comes into full view; and what looked at first like a passing dismissal of Sir James Stephen's legal analyses-"striving for a useless quintessence of all systems, instead of an accurate analysis of one" (403)-stands as a clear signpost. All legal systems are local, specific to a place and time; the idea of "Law-in-Itself" is an illusion. As Holmes would write much later, dissenting in Southern Pacific v. Jensen, "[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified... it is always the law of some state." 59 Moreover, every legal system is an artifact of history; all have evolved, grown, adapted (and many have died away) in response to changing social circumstances, pressures, and needs.
And this means that from the very broadest perspective the law-now understood as referring to the whole accumulated history and ongoing evolution of the myriad legal systems of the world-encompasses both the past and the future of the social organization of humanity; in short, of civilization. Holmes returns to this theme over and over:
If your subject is law, the roads are plain to anthropology, the science of man, to political economy, the theory of legislation, ethics, and thus by several paths to your final view of life.' 
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What a subject is this in which we are united,-this abstraction called the Law, wherein, as in a magic mirror, we see reflected not only our own lives, but the lives of all men that have been! ... to the lover of the law ... no less a history will suffice than that of the moral life of his race. 6 ' I venerate the law ... as one of the vastest products of the human mind. ... It has the final title to respect in that it exists, that it is not a Hegelian dream. (402) This is how the study of the law "connect[s] with the universe" and may even vouchsafe "a hint of the universal law" (406).
Holmes begins with a down-to-earth, practical view of the law; and, commenting that "a good deal of pretty poor stuff' goes under the name of jurisprudence (403), scoffs at the idea of a "quintessence of all law." Still, we can't classify him as "pragmatic," in the now-current everyday sense of focusing on the practical at the expense of the theoretical; for this would make it impossible to accommodate his emphatic declarations that "theory is my subject, not practical details" (405) and that "[w]e have too little theory in the law rather than too much" (404).62 It would be more accurate to say that, while he eschews uselessly free-floating abstractions and respects the practical concerns of the working attorney, Holmes aspires to nothing less than a comprehensive theoretical conception of the law qua ever-evolving human institution.
Holmes urges the tonic effect of looking at the law from the perspective of the Bad Man; acknowledging that this will "stink[] in the nostrils of those who are anxious to get as much ethics into the law as they can" (394), he insists that questions of law not be confused with questions of morals; he believes that judges are often mistaken or self-deceived about the real reasons for their rulings; and he recommends that they look clear-eyed (hard-nosed?), at considerations of "social advantage." So it is no wonder he is seen as "one of the most important forerunners" of the legal realist movement influence, that "th[e] concept of 'real rule' has been gaining favor since it was first put into clarity by Holmes." In this context-in a phrase startlingly reminiscent of Peirce' s criticisms of Descartes's "paper doubts"-Llewellyn contrasts "real" with merely "paper" rules; 65 and in the same article, reflecting on the interconnections of law and the social sciences, he observes that "Holmes' mind had travelled most of the road two generations back., 66 The same year, Jerome Frank described Holmes as "the Completely Adult Jurist., 67 So perhaps it would be fair to classify the realists as "post-Holmesians." Still, it is important not to forget that Holmes had caught, at the end of what Llewellyn thinks of as his proto-realist path, a glimpse of that "comprehensive theoretical vision of the law qua ever-evolving human institution" stressed in my reading.
IV. FILLING SOME POTHOLES IN THE PATH OF THE LAW
Even if it is plausible to think that a working attorney advising his client the Bad Man is trying to predict what a judge would decide, it seems ludicrous to suppose that this is what the judge himself is doing (though, to be sure, he may try to predict what a higher court might decide were the case to be appealed). This was the objection that came first to my mind; and, as I subsequently discovered, it had been made long before by Hart, 68 and, decades before that, by Fisch. 69 But now I see it can be avoided by reading Holmes with a little charity." Taking the perspective of working attorney and his client the Bad Man is a heuristic device, 7 ' a way of highlighting two key contrasts: between law and morality, and between The Law in the abstract and Massachusetts- An attorney may well be able to predict that if the Bad Man drives at 39 miles an hour in a 30-mile-an-hour zone he will not be subject to any penalty; but of course this doesn't mean that the speed limit is (say) 40 miles an hour, not 30. So, Luban argues, Holmes's account is "preposterous," missing the obvious fact that a rational Bad Man's risk-benefit analysis would take into account how likely it is that a law will be enforced. 7 2 But this objection also misfires. Holmes asks his audience to imagine an attorney advising a client what conduct is legal, not what illegal conduct might go undetected or unpunished-for his purpose is, precisely, to highlight the distinction between law and morality. (Perhaps he would have made this clearer had he written the relevant lines, in the manner of Peirce's revised, more realist, subjunctive version of the pragmatic maxim, in the subjunctive mood, in terms of what courts would decide were the case to come before them.)
More importantly, perhaps, criticisms like these focus on Holmes's first steps; while what is most valuable about "The Path of the Law," as I see it, is the much broader view to which those steps ultimately lead: a view which is all-encompassing, yet not unhelpfully abstract; firmly anchored in real-world institutions and practices-realistic in the ordinary-language sense of the word -yet not cynical; anti-essentialist in eschewing the search for a mythical "quintessence of all law," yet not anti-theoretical. Legal systems are local 73 -one might almost say (but not without appreciating the irony) essentially so; they are, as the jargon of our day would have it, "socially constructed," marked by the contingencies and curiosities of the circumstances in which they originally arose, and by each of the many Pushmepullyou mechanisms at work as they continue to grow and adapt to new circumstances. And yet ... and yet, the continuing history of the evolution of legal systems is the history of humanity's long, ragged struggle towards civilized social life.
To be sure, Holmes's integration of the specific and the general, the local and the global, the humdrum and the inspiring, is a long way from perfect. But it is good enough to repay the effort of trying to improve it, to fill some gaps where he seems to have "too little theory rather than too much"--especially where his argument seems, as it stands, covertly to presuppose the kind of purely abstract and essentialist philosophy of law that he officially, and in my opinion rightly, eschews.
Holmes steers clear of questions like "What is Law?", and the pretentiously unhelpful answers they are apt to prompt. It might be objected, however, that when he refers to "the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts" (391), and assumes that what's relevant is what penalty ajudge will impose on the Bad Man, and not, say, what penance his priest will demand or what the boss of the local Mafia family will have his goons do to him, Holmes implicitly takes for granted an answer to this question in terms of-well, of legal institutions. But there is another way of looking at this, more in harmony with the general tenor of Holmes's jurisprudence, that does not invite the essentialist kind of answer he is anxious to avoid.
In the spirit of Holmes's observation that "most differences" are merely differences of degree, "when nicely analyzed," 7 4 and of the regulative principle Peirce called "synechism"-that hypotheses that posit continuities are to be preferred over hypotheses that rely on sharp dichotomies 75 -I suggest looking at the continuum of systems of social norms from tribal and religious customs, taboos, rules, and penalties through the "illegal legal orders" of the favelas of which Boaventura de Sousa Santos writes, 76 to the most central, paradigmatic cases of legal systems past and present and the complex, overlapping, and sometimes conflicting meshes of federal and state or provincial legal orders, of national and international law, ... and so forth and so on; and, rather than fussing over which qualify as really, genuinely legal, exploring the respects in which they are like each other, and those in which they are unlike. 77 To be sure, this would be a tough job; still, I believe it could tell us everything we really need to know, without trapping us in a metaphysical impasse as the old essentialist question, "What is Law?" is apt to do. 78 Holmes urges that judges look to considerations of "social advantage," and specifically to the economic consequences of their rulings, but he doesn't seem to tell us where such considerations legitimately apply, or how they are to be weighed against considerations of other kinds. I can find nothing explicit in "The Path of the Law" that distinguishes, say, framing an innocent man to prevent public panic because there's a serial killer on the loose or reincarcerating a sexual predator beyond his sentence to prevent him from committing further crimes, from relying on considerations about incentives and such to hold all manufacturers of a certain type of drug partly liable when it is impossible to determine which of them actually made the drug that harmed these plaintiffs 79 (or to hold a manufacturer partly liable even when we know they didn't sell the drug that injured this plaintiff); 8 " nor, more 77 . Compare the strategy adopted in my Defending Science-Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003), ch. 6: rather than asking whether the social sciences are really sciences, exploring and trying to articulate the ways in which they are like the natural sciences, and the ways in which they are unlike.
78. The approach I am recommending has much in common with some ideas expressed in Llewellyn, who writes: "I am not going to attempt a definition of law.... A focus, a core, a center-with the bearings and boundaries outward unlimited." Karl Llewellyn, "A Realistic Jurisprudence-the Next Step" [supra, n.65], 432. More recently, arguing against "legal centralism" and urging a "centrifugal" over a "centripetal" approach, Galanter has suggested looking at the many and various non-legal means of settling disputes as operating "in the shadow of' the legal system narrowly conceived, which sets a framework for party negotiation by providing "bargaining chips." Marc Galanter, "Justice in Peirce is again helpful; this time, though, it is his conception of the growth of meaning on which we can draw. Thinking about how, as our knowledge grows, scientific concepts become deeper and thicker (and sometimes shed old connotations), the young Peirce had observed "[h]ow much more the word electricity means now than it did in the days of Franklin; how much more the term planet means now than it did in the time of Hipparchus. These words have acquired information." 2 Later he makes a similar point using a different and more immediately relevant kind of concept as example: "Symbols grow .... Such words as force, law, wealth, marriage, bear for us very different meanings than those they bore to our barbarous ancestors." 83 Yes; and concepts like liberty, right, etc., are deepened, thickened, made more specific (and sometimes stripped of old accretions) in the long, ongoing struggle of legal disputes and challenges, interpretations and reinterpretations. They are not although a member of the market producing DES for pregnancy use, appears not to have caused a particular plaintiff's injury").
81. Benjamin Cardozo, "Mr. 
Vol. 50
Platonically fixed and uncontestable, but initially thin, schematic concepts inherently open to more and less expansive readings, to finer specification, to broader extrapolation." Holmes conceives of the law as encompassing all the many and various legal systems, past and present: remember that description of the history of the evolution of the law as disclosing "every painful step and world-shaking contest by which mankind has fought and worked its way from savage isolation to organic social life"; 85 and he observes that "[a] man may live greatly in the law as well as elsewhere; there as well as elsewhere his mind may find its unity in an infinite perspective ."" This is a grand vision reminiscent of Peirce's conception of science as the long, ongoing struggle of the community of inquirers-the notional community of all those, past, present, and future, who have "storm[ed] the stronghold of truth," each new wave climbing clambering over those who went before. 87 In a speech the year before "The Path of the Law" Holmes had written:
The eternal procession [of generation after generation of lawyers, judges and legal thinkers] moves on, we in the front for the moment; and stretching away against the unattainable sky, the black spearheads of the army that has been passing in unbroken line already for over a thousand years." 88 This has more than a military metaphor in common with Peirce's conception of the human struggle to understand the world.
However, while Peirce makes an intimate connection between truth and inquiry by means of his pragmaticist conception of truth as the hypothetical Final Opinion that would be reached were inquiry to continue indefinitely, and reality as the object of that Final Opinion, 89 Holmes leaves one wondering 84 . From Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly [supra, n.80], 507: "the ever-evolving dictates ofjustice and fairness, which are the heart of our common-law system, require formation of a remedy for injuries caused by DES" (emphasis added). 89. So the true and the real, as Peirce defines them, are independent of what you, or I, or any individual think them to be; not, however, of what the hypothetical community of inquirers would think them to be at the end of inquiry. It is also worth noting that Peirce's definitions are not intended to provide any guarantee of steady progress towards or convergence on the truth, or even any guarantee that the truth will actually ultimately be attained.
how, exactly, he sees the evolution of legal systems as connected with "the moral life of the race." Some critics have suggested that Holmes's attitude to the relation of law and morality is just inconsistent. 9° It is, however, entirely consistent to maintain (as Holmes does) that law and morality cannot be identified-that the two are conceptually distinct, that "morally bad, unjust law" is not an oxymoron; and at the same time to hold (as Holmes also does) that there may be greater or lesser overlap in extension between law and morality, and that the evolution of law may constitute progress in a moral sense. But perhaps the critics have in mind, rather, the apparent difficulty of reconciling Holmes's insistence that he "take[s] for granted that no hearer of mine will misrepresent what I have to say as the language of cynicism," his description of the law as "the witness and external deposit of our moral life" (392), and the indications that, by "considerations of social advantage" he means something more like "promoting the good of society" than "favoring the interests of a given social class," with passages that suggest that he thinks might makes right. As I understand him, however, when Holmes writes of (legal) "battle grounds where ... the decision can do no more than embody the preference of a given body in a given place and time" (397), or of the more powerful interests' winning the struggle, what he means is that a legal system is a forum for competing social groups to sort out their conflicts without resorting to brute force. So it might be more accurate to see Holmes's conception of the evolution of the law as fumbling steps on the road to more civilized social life as manifesting a kind of meliorism.
But now it begins to appear that the problem with Holmes's view of the relation of law and morality is not an inconsistency but-ironically enough, given that he is sometimes accused of moral skepticism-a tendency to elide the weak, plausible thesis that the growth of legal systems mirrors the evolution of human social life, tracking moral steps forward and backward, into the much stronger and much less plausible thesis that the history of law is a history of moral progress. In early papers on "Primitive Notions in Modem Law," 9 1 as well as in the first chapter of The Common Law, Holmes points to the ways in which a primitive desire for vengeance, which he takes to be the original basis of law, has gradually been modified and adapted with the growth of civilization. As "an instructive example of the mode in which the law has grown ... from barbarism to civilization," Holmes refers to laws requiring that a slave or an ox that injures someone be stoned or surrendered by the current owner to the victim or his family, and to the provision in the Twelve Tables of Roman Law that an insolvent debtor may be cut up and his body divided among his creditors; 92 and then describes the ways in which such laws gradually changed and became more rational: "when ancient rules maintain themselves .... new reasons more fitted to the time have been found for them, and ... they gradually receive a new content, and at last a new form, from the grounds to which they have been transplanted. ... [I]f truth were not often suggested by error, if old implements could not be adjusted to new uses, human progress would be slow." 93 This last observation, like that phrase "from barbarism to civilization," strongly suggests that Holmes was assuming that the evolution of law is a progressive process.
Perhaps he is thinking, in part, that any peaceful means of settling disputes is better than the alternative and, in part, that some sort of stable and predictable legal order is necessary for any kind of civilized life; but obviously neither of these propositions is sufficient to establish a progressivist thesis. In a speech of 1913 Holmes observes that "[i]t is a misfortune if ajudge reads his conscious or unconscious sympathy with one side or the other prematurely into the law, and forgets that what seem to be first principles are believed by half his fellow men to be wrong." 94 Holmes repudiates the idea of moral axioms or first principles discoverable a priori; but, as I read him, he is no moral skeptic, but a moral fallibilist who thinks of ethics in an empirical, experimental way. So one might think of looking to James's moral philo-sophy-perhaps noting its affinity with Holmes's conception of "weighing of considerations of social advantage" in terms of accommodating the competing demands of different groups in society-for a more articulate theoretical account that might supply the missing argument.
For in "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life," James had argued that, since every desire makes some moral claim, one task of moral philosophy is, so far as possible, to reconcile competing desires: "The actually possible in this world is vastly narrower than all that is demanded; and there is always a pinch between the ideal and the actual, which can only be got through by leaving part of the ideal behind." 95 And Dewey, in effect, amplifies and refines James's account when he shifts the focus from what is actually desired to what is really desirable, genuinely conducive to human flourishing; and, not entirely by the way, argues that economic conditions are not to be despised as "mere" means, but must be taken seriously as important elements in "the construction of good. 9 6 But even assuming that an empirical, experimental style of moral philosophy such as James's or Dewey's is defensible-which certainly isn't something I can hope to settle here, but a whole other question for a whole other lifetime-there could still be no theoretical guarantee that the evolution of legal systems is bound to be morally progressive; not at every step, and not even by and large and on the whole and in the long run. Outside of those Hegelian dreams to which Holmes dismissively alludes, there can be no guarantee that some class or classes of people will not, in principle or in practice, be denied access to the justice system, or denied any voice in the process by which laws are made; there can be no guarantee against the evolution of oppressive, totalitarian societies and oppressive, totalitarian laws; and there can be no guarantee against the stagnation, or the decline, of civilized social life.
In 1924, in the course of his first attempt, with the help of a GermanEnglish dictionary, to read the first volume of Oswald Spengler's extraordinary, visionary, over-reaching, infuriating rhetorical tour de force, The Decline of the West, 97 Holmes wrote to Pollock: "when one suspects that a man knows something about life that one hasn't heard before one is uneasy ... It is long since I have got so much from a book as this, and if I heard that the swine were dead I should thank God." 98 In 1932, after reading both volumes in translation, he wrote again: "the accursed Spengler ... has as swelled a head as man can have and live, but the beast has ideas, many of which I don't know enough to criticize. I wish he were dead."
99 The "beast's" central and essential ideas, of course, were that all civilizations rise and fall, and that Western civilization was then in decline. For all its intellectual failings, for all its rhetorical excesses, Spengler's book must have been deeply unsettling to Holmes's hope that the evolution of the law tracks, not just the "moral life of the race," but the advance of civilization, of moral progress. Perhaps this explains Holmes's startlingly ambivalent reaction, his grudging acknowledgement that he had learned something from the "accursed Spengler"-the swine.
V. THEORY AND PRACTICE: MR. JUSTICE HOLMES I don't believe Holmes was trying to provide a decision-procedure for judges. Since his philosophy of law is anchored in the insight that legal systems are local, it would hardly be appropriate that it aspire to say how a judge here and now (or there and then) should decide (or should have decided) an issue; for judicial decisions are apt to be focused on questions specific to a place, a time, a legal history, and a social context. So while some may take its failure to supply such a decision-procedure as an objection to Holmes's philosophy of law, I do not. Skimming through the list of Holmes's own thousand-odd opinions, what strikes me is, first, the sheer variety and the narrow specificity of the issues involved-the power of the Massachusetts legislature to grant woman suffrage;" the restoration of remedies extinguished by lapse of time;' ' the right of the legislature to limit the height of boundary fences; 0 2 the right of the state to kill diseased horses;" 3 the doctrine of "attractive nuisance";" the constitutionality of laws restricting hours of work, 1 0 5 etc., etc., etc.-and then the near-impossibility of understanding Holmes's arguments without reference to the legal setting and the social circumstances in which they arose.
However, two themes that recur in Holmes's constitutional opinions may have an indirect bearing on my interpretation of "The Path of the Law." The first is that, while the Constitution has its roots in the past, it is intended for an unknown future. As Holmes wrote in Gompers:
the provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions .... Their significance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and their line of growth."°6 And in Missouri v. Holland:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that are also a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.' There is nothing I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that an important part of the community desires, in the insulated Of course, the same theme was heard, many years before, in one of Holmes's most celebrated opinions, his dissent in Lochner (1905) . The majority had ruled legislation that limited bakers' working hours to no more than 10 a day or 60 a week unconstitutional: it "necessarily interferes with the right of contract between the employer and the employee."" In dissent Justice Harlan, with Justices White and Day, argued that "the liberty of contract may ... be subjected to regulations ... [to] guard the public health," and that bakery work was so strenuous, hot, and dusty that the restriction of hours was justifiable on public-health grounds. But Holmes's dissent not only observes that "[a] reasonable man might think it a proper measure on the score of health"; it also stresses states' freedom to experiment: 111 This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law. ...[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory.... [I]t is made for people of fundamentally differing views 112 I don't believe it is too fanciful to see this theme as having some connection with (though it is obviously not entailed by) Holmes's conception of the law as a forum for resolving the inevitable struggles between social groups in a peaceful way-nor, probably, as also having something to do with his personal experience of the horrors of the Civil War. ' By the end of his long life, Mr. Justice Holmes, the "Yankee from Olympus,"" ' 4 stood high in the public esteem. A volume celebrating his ninetieth birthday (the volume in which Cardozo raised his important question about the fixity or flexibility of legal concepts) included a notable tribute from Dewey entitled "Justice Holmes and the Liberal Mind." Though Holmes had "no social panacea to dole out, no fixed social program, no code of fixed ends," Dewey wrote, he was profoundly committed to "[1]iberalism as a method ... the adoption of the scientific habit of mind in application to social affairs"; that he adopted this scientific habit of mind as a judge, in restricted legal contexts, in no way lowered the value of his work "as a pattern of the liberal mind in operation." ' 5 And on Holmes's death, in 1935, the New York Times described him as "the chief liberal of [the] supreme bench for 29
Since then, however, many have come to believe Holmes's reputation undeserved-a triumph of magnificent literary style over miserable judicial substance-and to criticize his judicial opinions as conservative, narrowminded, benighted, or worse." 7 Whom one would have wanted as a friend really isn't the point. Still, it's an intriguing question. Reflecting on it, I suspect I might well have found Holmes too Olympian for my taste; as, it seems, James eventually came to find him' 2 3 -not surprisingly, for James manifests a sympathetic understanding of human foibles, and of the suffering caused to some individuals by even the most benign social institutions, nowhere to be found in Holmes's; for example this, from "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life":
The pinch is always here. Pent in under every system of moral rules are innumerable people whom it weighs upon, and goods which it represses; and these are always rumbling and grumbling in the background .... See the abuses which the institution of private property covers ... the unnamed and unnameable sorrows which the tyranny, on the whole so beneficent, of the marriage institution brings to so many ... the wholesale loss of opportunity under our regime of so-called equality and industrialism .... See our kindliness for the humble and the outcast, how it wars with the stern weeding-out which until now has been the condition of every perfection in the breed. See everywhere the struggle and the squeeze. 2 and perhaps it is the motjuste. When one turns to the controversies over Holmes's judicial practice, the first conjecture that comes to mind is that his admirers are simply focusing on different opinions from those that draw his detractors' attention: the admirers, probably, focus on his dissenting opinions in cases like Lochner and Abrams (where, in a memorable defense of the right to free speech, Holmes protested the imposition of a twenty-year sentence for the publication of "two leaflets that I believe the defendants had as much right to publish as the Government had to publish the Constitution ... now vainly invoked by them"); 12 6 while the detractors focus on his rulings in cases like Britt 127 I'm not going to get embroiled in these controversies; but I will suggest that part of the problem, probably, is that since Dewey wrote his tribute there has been a significant shift not only in the extension but apparently also in the meaning of the word "liberal." What Dewey had in mind in calling Holmes a great liberal was, evidently, his willingness to allow the states to make social experiments. Nowadays, however, while the upshot Holmes favored in
Lochner would be thought of as liberal, his reasoning would likely be perceived as conservative, as illiberal. 3 ' I suspect there is a fascinating historico-socio-legal-linguistic-story to be told about when and how this shift took place, 3 2 and about the much larger process of which it is probably part, a larger process in which older understandings of right, liberty, etc., have been contested and expanded over and over (and doubtless, also, a fascinating psycho-philosophical story about why Holmes didn't, like Cardozo, see any of this coming). Telling these stories, however, is beyond my present powers; and it is time, anyway, to return to the issues about the meaning of "pragmatism" with which I began.
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE OLD
LEGAL PRAGMATISM AND THE NEW "Was Holmes really a pragmatist?" 1 33 -bad question. We know that Holmes didn't officially ally himself with pragmatism, and that he had reservations about some of Peirce's and, especially, James's ideas; we know that there were many other influences on his thinking-among them Mill, Bentham, Austin, etc., etc.. But we should also be aware of the many affinities of Holmes's thinking with ideas from the classical pragmatist tradition in philosophy-affinities which, as we can now see, go far beyond the similarity between his articulation of the working attorney's conception of what it means to say that the current law in Massachusetts is thus and so, and Peirce's of what it means to say that this diamond is hard, that this proposition is true, or that this thing or kind or natural law is real.' 34 Peirce criticizes the Cartesian notion of intuitive certainty and describes himself as a "contrite fallibilist, ready to dump the whole cartload of his beliefs the moment experience is against them"; 135 Dewey mounts a sustained attack on the Platonic, as well as the Cartesian, "quest for certainty"; 1 36 Holmes observes that "certainty generally is an illusion ... no concrete proposition is self-evident" (397). Peirce objects that Descartes' epistemology, which makes the individual the judge of truth, is "viciously individualistic," and contrasts it with the method of science, which relies on interpersonal, objective standards; Holmes contrasts the objective, external legal use of terms like "malice" or "intent" with their subjective, moral use. 137 Peirce complains about the arguments of moral philosophers and theologians: "it is not the reasoning that determines what the conclusion shall be, but the conclusion that determines what the reasoning shall be. This is sham reasoning";1 38 Holmes writes that judges think they are calculating legally-correct answers when really they are relying on perhaps unconscious policy preferences. Peirce writes to James that "it is of the very essence of [pragmatism] that belief is expectation of the future in all cases," 139 and Dewey observes that pragmatism "does not insist upon antecedent phenomena, but upon consequent phenomena, ... the possibilities of action";"° Holmes's philosophy of law is forward-looking, calling for judges to "consider and weigh the ends of legislation, the means of attaining them, and the cost" (403). In the context of his agapism, a cosmological theory of how order might evolve from chaos, Peirce writes of "the law of mind": "ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others that stand to them in a peculiar relation of the concept at arms' length, "truth"-don't always seem to realize how thoroughly this cynicism undermines the very idea of justice);
147 by the wretchedly ambiguous use of "foundationalism" and "anti-foundationalism" encouraged by Rorty in epistemology, 4 8 and extrapolated by legal scholars to jurisprudence; and by a persistent false equation of "anti-essentialist" and "anti-abstraction" with "anti-theoretical."
The conceptual trap set by "foundationalism" and "anti-foundationalism" is, in brief, this. In epistemology, "foundationalism" has at least three senses; in the first, it refers to a family of theories of epistemic justification characterized by their reliance on a distinction between basic ("foundational") and derived beliefs; in the second, to a conception of epistemology as an a priori discipline the task of which is to provide the foundation of all legitimate claims to knowledge; and in the third, to the idea that our standards of better and worse evidence, more and less justified beliefs, must be, not merely conventional, but grounded in some relation of justification and truth. Only the third has an analogue in legal theory: the idea that legal rules, to be (in a non-epistemic sense) justified, must be grounded in some relation to (presumably, moral) values. But Holmes's account is not clearly antifoundationalist in this sense: while it repudiates the idea that what the law is may be deduced from some overriding set of moral principles, it also urges that judges look to the social benefits and disadvantages of their rulings, and it is if anything over-optimistic about the connection between the evolution of law and moral progress.
The false equation of "anti-essentialist" and "anti-theoretical" has been compounded by some unhappy developments in the use of the word "theory": a too-ready assumption that "theory" must mean "moral, social or political theory" (which are really only a couple of sub-classes of the vast variety of types of theory); and, relatedly, the specialized sense recently taken on by "Theory"-now with that imposing upper-case "T"-to connote this or that (feminist, postcolonialist, etc.) principle for "reading" literary or legal texts.
Returning to my opening quotations, we see that, like Atiyah, Schneider and Ingram are apparently using "pragmatism" in its ordinary-language rather than its philosophical sense; that Leiter has apparently misconstrued the purport of Holmes's description of the law as involving "prophecies" of what judges will decide; 149 and that Grey, Posner, and Tamanaha apparently assume that legal pragmatism must be anti-theoretical because it is anti-essentialist. But Luban's formula, "result-oriented, historically-minded antiformalism," briefly captures some key elements of Holmes's jurisprudence quite well; and Tamanaha's reference to the "middle way" captures something important to the tenor of the old-pragmatist tradition.
In 2004, concluding my brief history of the fragmentation of philosophical pragmatism, I wrote that:
[i]t is easy to get hung up on the question of which variants qualify as authentic pragmatism; but probably it is better-potentially more fruitful, and appropriately forward-looking-to ask, rather, what we can borrow from the riches of classical pragmatism, and what we can salvage from the intellectual shipwreck of the new. 1 5°H ere, exploring the fragmentation of legal pragmatism, I have suggested a reading of Holmes's conception of law informed by ideas from the classical pragmatist tradition in philosophy: an interpretation in which "The Path of the Law" leads us to a comprehensive theoretical vision of the law as a vast congeries of legal systems, each local to its place and time, and all responding, some more and some less successsfully, to human needs and to the conflicts that inevitably arise in any society.15
